Aspects of the Hawley-Smoot tarriff by Livingstone, Davie
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1947
Aspects of the Hawley-Smoot tarriff
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/18765
Boston University



\'
<#&"
/
v r
' *
BOSTON UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL
Thesis
ASPECTS OF THE HAWLEY-SM0OT TARIFF
by
David Livingstone
(A. 3., Columbia University, 1942)
submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
1947
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2016 with funding from
Boston Library Consortium Member Libraries
https://archive.org/details/aspectsofhawleysOOIivi
Approved
by
First Header
Second Reader
Professor of Economics
Professor of Economics

TAELE OF CONTENTS
Page
I Introduction 1
II The Setting of The Hawley-Smoot Tariff 14
1. Influence of World War I on Tariffs 14
2. Indebtedness and Currency Disorder
a Cause of Tariffs 16
3. Influence of Agricultural Maladjustment 17
4. Growth of Tariffs in Europe 20
5. Change in Financial Status of U. S 24
6. Post-War Commercial Policy of U. S 28
(a) Immigration 28
(b) Merchant Marine 28
(c) Trade Promotion 28
(d) Emergency Tariff - 1921 28
7. Tariff Act of 1922 29
III Congressional Economics: Protectionism In The
Making 32
1. Majority Views - Report of Ways and Means
Committee 32
(a) Description of the Report 32
(b) Reason for ’’Readjustment” 33
(c) Agriculture 34
(d) Prices under the Tariff 35
(e) Nationalism 35
(f) Summary 37
2. Minority Views - Report of Ways and Means
Committee 37
(a) Need for Foreign Markets 37
(b) Agriculture on Export Basis 38
(c) Summary 38
*.
-xi-
Page
3, Hearings - The Committee System 39
(a) Foreign Costs 39
(b) Domestic Costs 39
(c) 'Prevents tive" duties 42
4. Debates 42
(a) Eastern Conception of Tariff 43
(b) Western Conception of Tariff 43
(c) Comparative Advantage 44
IV The Tariff: Description and Comparison 45
1. General Form of the Act 45
2. Types of Duties 45
( a ) Va lua tion 4b
3. Trend to Protection 46
(a) Sugar - Wheat 47
4. Agriculture 49
(a) Dairy Products 49
5. Manufacturing 50
(a) Rejection of Economic Reasoning 51
6. Free List 51
7. The Tariff Commission 52
(a) Reorganization 53
(b) Its Powers 55
V The Tariff Accomplished: National And World
Reaction 58
1. Foreign Press Reaction 58
2. Types of Reaction to Tariff Act 59
3. Relation of Act to the World. Depression 59
4. Extent of Reaction and Retaliation 62
* m *»
Page
(a) Switzerland 63
(b) Italy 66
( c ) Canada 66
(d) Relation of American Tariff to General
Tariff Development 66
5. Reaction in U. S. to Tariff 69
(a) Decline of Trade 69
(b) Collier Tariff Eill 70
(c) Program of Democratic Party 71
(d) Reciprocal Trade Agreements 71
Conclusion 73
1. Need for Theoretical Knowledge 73
2. Reason for Political Success of Tariff 74
(a) Role of Consumer and Importer 75
3* Manipulation of Rate to Compromise Differences .76
4. Necessary Steps to be Taken in Committee 77
(a) Need for Fundamental Examination of
Tariff 77
5. Need for International Trade 73
6. Isolationist v. Internationalist Viewpoint.... 79
(a) Consequences of Tariff on International
Relations 79
7. Need to Coordinate Tariff with Foreign Policy. 81
.m •
*
,
. .
.
'
INTRODUCTION
The interplay of sectional interest, the pressure of
powerful industrial and agricultural groups, and the constant
growth and change in America both politically and economically
have rendered policy making a delicate and difficult task in
all fields, but nowhere have the difficulties been greater
than in the field of tariff making. Pew issues have received
greater publicity, few have resulted in more protracted de-
bate or more vituperation, few legislative acts have been
subject to such constant and extensive revision, and few
tariffs have embodied these elements more completely than
the Tariff Act of 1930, the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. Its study
is a rewarding experience.
The history of tariff making in the United States is as
long as the history of the nation itself. ^ During the era of
the Confederation the states were free to regulate foreign
commerce as they desired. The period from 1780 to 1789 saw
Pennsylvania enact fifteen tariffs; Virginia, twelve, and
Massachusetts, New York, and Maryland, seven each. In the
South they were mainly for revenue, but those of New England
and the Middle States were generally for protection. The
1. The following account based on material included in Bogart
and Kemmerer, Economic History of the American People
,
(New York, 1942), and Coman, K., The Indus tria 1 History
of the United States, (New York, 1916"]7
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aectional differences which have characterized tariff debate
down to our own time had, thus, already emerged. On 4 July
1789 the first tariff act was passed by the new federal
government* Duties were for revenue although protection had
been urged by many.
In 1789 Hamilton’s classic ’’Report on Manufactures”
appeared, a work which Bogart has called, ’’perhaps the most
2
able presentation of the case for protection ever written.”
For Hamilton the industrial condition of the country justi-
fied not merely the application of duties for revenue, but
also for the sake of defending our infant industries against
the older snd better equipped countries. American manufac-
turers suffered from lack of capital and labor and they had
to pay higher wages and higher interest rates than did, for
example, the English. These disadvantages could be overcome,
however, if the entrepreneur was given encouragement.
Skilled labor, he pointed out, was coming from Europe in
quantity, attracted by the high wages and low living costs.
Capital, too, would, be attracted if opportunities for invest-
ment were present. A tariff would create these opportunities.
Hamilton urged the protection of textile goods, metal,
glass work, sugar refineries together with all the finished
products from leather, wood, and cereals. The merchant
class, he added, might be compensated for losses in inter-
2. Bogart and Kemmerer, op. clt
.
,
p. 389.
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nationel trade by the development of domestic commerce. The
raw materials of the South would be exchanged for the manu-
factured goods of the North to the profit of both sections.
Farmers, planters, and lumbermen who were finding the foreign
market for their product increasingly precarious would soon
realize the advantage of a growing home market in the form of
manufacturing towns with their constantly increasing demand
for food and raw materials. Consumers might at first be
forced to pay somewhat higher prices for the protected
commodities, but the immediate cost would be ultimately off-
set by the benefits that would flow from the system. Prices
would eventually fall below that of the foreign commodity
which was subject to heavy freight rates. ’’When a domestic
manufacture has attained to perfection, and has engaged in the
prosecution of it a competent number of persons, it invariably
becomes cheaper. Being free from the heavy charges which
attend the importation of foreign commodities, it can be
afforded, and accordingly seldom or never fails to be sold
cheaper, in process of time, than was the foreign article for
which it is a substitute. The internal competition which
takes place soon does away with everything like monopoly,
and by degrees reduced the price of the article to the mini-
mum of a reasonable profit on the capital employed. This
3
accords with the reason of the thing and with experience.”^
3. Quoted from Coman, K., op. cit
. ,
p. 147.
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Kemilton argued that the United States could not afford to
remain an agricultural nation dependent on foreigners both
for the disposal of surpluses and the purchase of supplies.
National self-sufficiency was essential to national indepen-
dence.
The tariff legislation following publication of the
"Report" evidenced its influence. The rates of duties were
steadily increased and by 1816 the principle of the protec-
tive tariff was firmly implanted in the United States. The
act of that year was accompanied by an elaborate report, the
work of Alexander J. Dallas, Secretary of the Treasury.
Dallas classified American industries into three groups. The
first group contained those manufactures which were firmly
and permanently established. Duties on those items were to
be prohibitive. Domestic competition would, he wrote, lower
the prices of such goods. In the second group he placed the
infant industries, those manufactures which had only recently
been established. On these the duty was to be somewhat less.
The ultimate advantage to the country would compensate in
time for the temporary rise in prices, he asserted. Those
items which could only be secured by importation were
classified in group three. On these, revenue consideration
was to be the governing principle. Other acts followed in
rapid succession.
In 1824 a tariff was enacted for which Henry Clay,
father of the "American System" was the special advocate.
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Four years later another revision was undertaken. Coman says
of this; "Politics played so large a part in the tariff
legislation of 1828 that the result was satisfactory to no
4
section of the country except the Middle West". Luties on
pig iron, wool, and hemp were elevated to a prohibitive level
while flax was placed for the first time on the protected
list. Compensating duties on such items as iron manufactures,
cordage, and woolens were not high enough to offset the in-
crease in the cost of production. This tariff led to a re-
action in 1832 which restored the rates approximately to the
level of 1824. A year later passage of the so called "Com-
promise” tariff was secured by Clay, As enacted it provided
for the gradual reduction of all duties in excess of 20 per
cent in the Act of 1832 to a general level of 20 per cent.
By 1842 this reduction had been effected. Two months after
the minimum tariff became effective, however, the Whig
majority in the Congress erected a tariff giving protection
to the industries of New England and the Middle States.
In 1846 there was inaugurated an era of so called
"revenue" tariffs, an era which ended in 1861 when the
Morrill Act was passed. Then 1864 again saw increases insti-
tuted. "One of the unexpected legacies of the war", says
Bogart, "was thus a highly protective tariff system, which
came to be accepted as the permanent commercial policy of
the country even after the urgent revenue needs of the
1, Coman, ET op. cit
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treasury had passed away.” Until 1870 hardly any change was
made, but in that year, with the Treasury surfeited with
revenue, reductions were made in some rates* In the tariff
of 1872 a general reduction of 10 per cent was made, but in
1875 the cut was restored and from then until 1883 no further
change was made.
In 1882 a Tariff Commission was appointed by President
Arthur. After study this body recommended that duties be
reduced 20 to 25 per cent, but the Congress at that time con-
tained a large protectionist element and the reductions in
the Act of 1883 were nearer 5 per cent. With the siginificant
title of, "an act to reduce the revenue and equalize duties
on imports" the McKinley Tariff was passed in 1888. It
boosted the average level of duties up to about 49.5 per cent.
Coman writes that "the enactment was notable for the appear-
ance of certain business combinations as influential factors
in the determination of duties." She lists the binding twine
trust and the American Sugar Refining Company. This act was
soon repudiated as a political reaction swept the Republicans
out of power, the Democrats in. The Wilson-Corman Act of
1894 which followed reduced the average level of duties about
10 per cent. In 1897, however, the Republicans returned to
power and in 1897 they secured passage of the Dingley Tariff
which elevated the average rate of duties to approximately
57 per cent, the highest it had ever been in our history.
5. Eogart and Kemmener, op. cl t
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For the next ten years the tariff issue remained in the
background while trust regulation and conservation occupied
the center of thinking. But tariff reformers were at work
and the idea that the tariff was largely responsible for the
development of large scale combinations, the rise in prices,
and the consequent advance in the cost of living found many
adherents. ''The mother of all trusts is the customs tariff",
asserted H. 0. Havemyer, himself president of the sugar trust.
The Republicans, aware of the trend cageily suggested that
tariff revision should be entrusted to its friends. Revision
was one of their campaign pledges of 1908. The Payne-Aldrich
Act of 1909, which was intended to fulfill this pledge reduced
some duties slightly and in some cases even raised them. The
wool and woolen duties of Schedule K, denounced by President
Taft as "iniquitous" remained unaltered. Duties were in
general about 40 per cent. A Tariff Board was also created,
but three years later it expired from lack of Congressional
support.
The failure of the Congress to effect a material downward
revision of the duties was cause for considerable dissatis-
faction and was, indeed, a factor in the formation of the
Progressive Party in 1912. Evidence of disapproval was
registered in the victory scored in the same year by the
Democratic Party which captured both the Congress and the
Presidency. In the next year this party passed the Underwood
Tariff Act. Although it was by no means a free trade measure.
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according to Bogart it represented "the most complete reversal
of tariff policy since the movement to high protection in the
sixties". Wilson argued, in speaking to the Congress, that
the new bill should be based on new principles. "We must
abolish", he said, "everything that bears even the semblance
of privilege or of any kind of artificial advantage, and put
our business men and producers under the stimulation of a
constant necessity to be efficient, economical, and enterpris-
ing, masters of competitive supremacy, better workers and
merchants than any in the world the object of the tariff
duties henceforth laid must be effective competition, the
whetting of American ivi ts by contest with the wits of the rest
of the world." Lobbying was a conspicuous feature of the
environment in which the act was developed. Indeed, it
became so troublesome that Wilson was forced to specially
rebuke the lobbyists. "Washington", he said, "has seldom
seen so numerous, so industrious, or so insidious a lobby."
"The Government, in all its branches, ought to be relieved
from this intolerable burden and this constant interruption
7
to the calm progress of debated". The average level of
duties under this act was about 30 per cent.
In 1921 and again in 1922 tariffs were enacted by the
Congress of which more will be said later. Discussion of them
is a prerequisite to the understanding of the Tariff Act of
6. Quoted from Harlow, Ralph V., The Growth of the United
State?
,
(New York, 194b), Vol. II, p. 354.
7. Ibid., p. 355.
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1930. But it is in the light of the long historical tradition
of tariff making that the Hawley-Smoot Act must be introduced
and its problems interpreted, for the influence of traditional
commitments has been a vital factor in the construction of
tariff bills. The Republicans have constantly extolled the
merits of a high tariff and high tariffs have been the re-
flection of Republican power, while lower duties have gener-
ally followed Democratic victory. Historical tradition then
4an help to explain the action of the Congressional majority
*?
in 1929 and 1930.
The question of a protective tariff in 1930 had been
settled primarily on the basis of America's pre-World War I
tradition and experience. At that time Europe held enormous
blocks of United States securities and with the interest
derived from them as well as dollars gained from other
source, was able to meet American payments. With the World
War, however, Europe was forced to sell off large numbers of
these securities. At the same time American industry grew
tremendously. Under the impact of war infant industries
matured, their capacity developed. The implication of this
fact did not become immediately evident, for the large loans
of both private investors and the United States Government
maintained the appearance of former conditions. American pro-
ductive capacity continued to be employed, foreign nations
>
continued to buy, but the basis was the vast credit that was
to prove unsound. The need for freer exchange of goods was
l
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not seen. Furthermore, the psychologies 1 climate of the time
militated against the intelligent consideration of our
national Interest in a world in which we were one of the fore-
most powers. A salient feature of American thinking, both
public and private, was the firm belief in isolationism. One
of the cardinal features of our tariff policy was that it was
a "domestic issue". The economic growth and change of the
United States, a process that had been tremendously hastened
by the war, was little understood. More generally, however,
the economic and political conditions in all parts of the
world contributed to the difficulty of American policy raking
and only by reference to this larger sphere can the problems
of the Hawley-Smoot Act be illuminated.
When, after four years of bitter fighting, the Armistice
ended hostilities Europe was demoralized, her normal economic
processes were disrupted. Changes in political boundaries,
the depreciation of currency, the growth of tariff barriers
further complicated the problem. Truly a great transformation
had taken place, but its magnitude was not at first apparent.
The social economic structure of Russia broke in 1917, Italy
in 1922, but not until 1933 did the full implications make
themselves evident in Germany, or, for that matter, the
United States. The war, further, meant as great a change for
the victor as for the vanquished. The western powers fell
prey to disaster also.
England, once the financial and commercial center of the
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world lost both power and prestige. Her industries were in
a state of flux, her debt enormous, and the pound, one of the
stablest currencies of the pre-war world, fluctuated widely
as a result of the abandonment of the gold standard. In
France conditions were even worse. She had suffered tremen-
dous physical destruction and the Government, already almost
bankrupt, had to finance the tremendous irrports necessary for
rehabilitation by increasing still further its public debt.
In Central Europe, however, the demoralization was even more
complete. Austria Hungary had been replaced by the "successio:
states. ,f Political boundaries were multiplied and unnatural
economic units established which began to assert their new
independence by erecting tariff barriers. Germany emerged
from the war loaded with debt, with an Inflated currency
and stagnating industry.
Carlton J. H. Hayes writes:
Formal peace was made but it ushered in
no millenium. What the World War and the ensuing
peace settlement actually did was to disillusion
a vast number of Europeans and to stimulate
pessism rather than optimism. As we now look
back on the first two decades of the twentieth
century, we perceive that the World War - its
antecedents, its course, its immediate con-
sequences - marked the end of one historic era
and the beginning of another. It ushered in a
different Europe, and a different world, politi-
cally, economically, and intellectually . 3
It was into this world that America emerged as a powerful
and influential nation. Certainly her influence during the
6. Hayes, C. J. H., A Political and Cultural His tory of
Modern Europe, Vol . TT, ^ITew YorF^ 1939), pp. b£l^F
X _ —
Q too i IboC Wiow
.
.
If :'>C “ 0^
'
rr\ ’ ••
.
.( *. ;.
-
t Cl t
. f 1 1 J (Hi
t O'
’
> f
:
! f
;
.
’
'
•
. r
r
i ' . .vl "
. O '. 1
XOlwv: v • ' tin ' t .f :• -v -• "t . be< > ' t i>: • ici
“
b 1 : • :i ?
«
.
noilier
.
1 £>»» v e J : r } > c i" <>o ‘*xr C {
> l
' i ? J . ' ir.cn
i < . E s.'S. £ £ el. c.} mPw bib Clf-WtOf* Ji. >LD?'Xl;t9E eo«9fr .
j JLi ». cJ bjtt! 8. -• >qo fu/! u *r • Jms fi Isev ?
:I( f /. a..
.
.
••
i .'*Rl
srfcf 1c i 9beo >b ov\1 JetII errftf no >foa<i
1 J -0 t 30'
o : b t o «. ‘
•
'
-*
. o 1 .*
.
nfi :i bn °
t L l « - :
’ r n : I ' b
. f < I ay : <? r,r : % 'He y
,
<
.
>ne [ y.’allo 1 '
.
-
* t
•-
.
*
* •
-12
thirties was paramount. The dramatic after-effects of the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff illustrates this proposition with startling
clarity. Erection of the highest trade barrier in its history
around the greatest lender and one of the greatest creditors
at a time when the world was beginning the plunge into the
great depression did much to precipitate the general stampede
to economic anarchy. America's importance and influence in
the world was hardly discounted in the minds of foreigners by
murmurs of isolationism. Americans failed to understand their
own power and influence and because of this, as well as the
*
complexities and confusions of Europe and Asia, the United
States failed to adopt a cogent trade policy. Perhaps the
main defect in congressional thinking was the failure to
recognize the fundamental alteration in America's economic
position. Almost overnight she had changed from a debtor to
a creditor nation. Congressional and Administration thinking,
however, failed to encompass this primary fact. More than
anything' else it was this that made possible the Hawley-Smoot
Tariff.
This paper attempts to follow the course of the Tariff
Act of 1930 from its incipient beginnings through the debates
to its ultimate consequences in the national and international
sphere. Section I developed the relationship of the Hawley-
Smoot Act to the general accentuation of protectionist
philosophy throughout the world and the growth of trade
barriers on an international scale, to the breakdown of
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economic activity which resulted from the war and from the
growth of nationalism. Section II is an attempt to describe
the dominant modes of thought, the economic ideas of the
majority and minority party members as expressed in the
debates in the Congress and the views, as well, of the repre-
sentatives of pressure groups as they are found in the report
of the hearings. Section III discusses the tariff as a
finished product, as it was enacted into law. Section IV
discusses the consequences of the law, its relationship to the
world depression 8nd to the growth of anarchy.
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II. THE SETTING OF TIIE HAWLEY -SMOOT TARIFF
The Hawley-Smoot Tariff was the product of forces some
of which had been set in motion by the first World War and
others which had teen suffused with a new vigor as a result
of the conflict. The Tariff Act of 1930 was not an isolated
phenomenon. It may have been one of the more extreme examples
of protectionism in the post war world, but it was not without
precedent either in this country or abroad.'
1
' The world scene
provided a proper setting for its enactment.
Certainly the psychological climate of the post war era
was one which was favorable to the growth of tariffs. It is in
this elementary level, in the attitude of peoples towards one
another, that much understanding of the Issues that developed
may be reached. The idea that people of common stock, language,
historic tradition should live in a state of their own making
had been the aspiration of millions during the war and the
keynote of President Wilson’s policy. The peace treaties
translated these aspirations into fact. During 1919-20 the
map of the continent was reconstructed. Empires were wiped
out, fragments of nations were consolidated and the system of
states as it reappeared was nationalistic to a notable extent.
1. Williams^ J . H
. ,
"The United States Tariff and Our Inter-
national Financial Position", Proceedings of the Academy
of Political Science, Vol. 15, No. 3 (June, 1933)
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Thls legacy of the war holds more than political interest, for
the nationalism which had been intensified by war and reinfor-
ced by the treaties was expressed quite as fully in the
2
economic sphere.
The redrawing of the map on national lines obliterated
four great imperial empires, the Dual Monarchy, the German
Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Russian Empire. From the
partitioned empires and from the fusing together of fragmen-
tary elements of the same national groups six new states were
crested: Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Poland. Serbia (Yugoslavia), Rumania, Greece, Italy, France,
and Denmark were given additional territory. On the other
hand Germany, Austria, Hungary, Turkey, and Russia were re-
duced in size. When the redrawing had been accomplished,
where twenty-one states had stood in 1914 there were now
twenty-seven. The settled economic patterns of the prewar
era had been destroyed and replaced with unsettled national-
istic units which had little economic foundation. The dis-
membering of Austra -Hungary increased the number of industrial
states in Europe by two. Austria, with its industrial heart
at Vienna, became the Austrian republic, while Bohemia and
Moravia became the Republic of Czechoslovakia with industries
2 ~, Salter, A., "The Future of Economic Nationalism", Foreign
Affairs
,
Vol. XI, (October, 1932), passim.
3. Hayes, C. J. t H., A Political and Cultural History of
Modern Europe, Vol. II, (Mew~York^ 1939"), p. 647.
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settled around Prague. The Hungarian portion of the dual
Monarchy was likewise recast. Hungary itself was to lead a
separate existence, while much of her territory was parcelled
4
out to Italy, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Aus trie -Hungarian
Monarchy had been preponderantly agrarian with important In-
dustrial centers, but the treaty created in Austria an area
which depended on high agrarian imports, while Hungary was a
5preponderantly agrarian country with a large surplus of grain."
Many of the fragments into which this monarchy had been broken
adopted tariffs almost immediately. Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Yugoslavia all raised trade barriers thus lacing an area with
custom walls which had hitherto been free from them. That
normal commercial relationships in this area were distrubed
hardly needs saying.
The cause of these tariffs lay in the desire to industri-
alize the state. The nationalistic aspiration to reduce
economic dependence on other states took precedence over
economic reasoning. Bulgaria’s tariff level evinced her deter-
6
mination to industrialize her country. Rumania designed her
7
tariff to stimulate systematically selected industries. In
spite of the large proportion of her population engaged In
agriculture and forestry (1921-64$), Poland deliberately
4. Llepman, H.
,
Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of
Europe
,
(London, 1938), p. 1627
5. iFid., p. 80.
6. iFTd
. , p. 172.
7. Ibid., p. 160.
-t -
, . JT f ' i 8 ie f j .
'•"I l .. -
‘ r: i 1 . 'j L'.r eliiiw t 01 :[ r.' .
,
- f-
'1C
'
sjeiii no J k ni ‘>©J o ;dse*id r * Jiicl ,*’ 3^nao Ial rt^8iJb
.
.
'
8 < t
' M'l r s
;
aJtoal i •,, .1 a*ial*ned obn^. * baal’Vt IX a civnlec
-
•
•
zc* 1 { rr<*ic
r
o*ib^ -go Ir<non
.
' if.
•
.
.
-
!
" i •
: . Oo 8©i fi 'let i*0 c: pa© VI 9CTO oi JO! 009
d level UlTatf e’aj . jnlnoe#e*i oltaoncoo
.
‘
r •
.«'•. i
.
( :
'
:
i:
' <
- r I 'T.-‘ r o*: :
.
. . ,
•
'
-
')0 ' i . « • •-
« . . • *
. b:V . • * . ' I . 'j
. o ' , < . I * ^
-17-
planned for industrialization and the reduction of industrial
8
imports. Although Hungary was almost devoid of industrial
raw materials she did have at Budapest and some other cities
a concentration of important industries. These industries
had been organized in pre-war days to service an area much
larger than the one left by the treaty of 1917. Regardless,
however, of the newly limited home market, the economic policy
9
of Hungary was one of out and out protectionism. Such
countries as Canada, Brazil, Australia, and Japan cut off
from their traditional sources of supply by the war had
developed ’’infant industries” and these industries were now
1
0
given protection.
There is still another basic force which deserves
attention, for its influence on the commercial policies of
the nations of Europe and America has been deep and extended.
During the war far reaching changes occured in the structure
11
of international indebtedness. After hostilities had
ceased this development continued to the accompaniment of the
inflation end collapse of most of the currencies of Europe.
Between 1924 and 1927 these inflated currencies were stabilized
8. IbidT7 1557'
9. Ibid
. ,
p. 162.
10.
Williams
,
’’The United States Tariff and Our International
Financial Position”, op. c i
t
.
,
p. 3.
11.
Brand, R. H., ’’Interna tiona 1 Monetary Problems”, Pro-
ceedings of the American Academy of Political Science,
Vol. 15, No. 2, (January, 1933), passim.
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upon an old or new gold parity. Following the stabilization,
however, increases were made in duties in order, it was
asserted, to maintain the gold value of the duties for those
countries which had adopted a new parity. Countries which
retained their pre-war parity raised their duties to prevent
12
dumping by countries with devalued currency. Further, a
number of agrarian countries were heavily in debt to foreign
countries and were forced to resort to a policy of extreme
protection to reduce their imports to the lowest minimum in
an effort to maintain their balance of trade and their obliga-
tions. This was necessary if they were to maintain their
currency since in the absence of invisible exports a deficit
in their balanceof trade was equivalent to a deficiency in
13
their balance of payments. The effect of these increases
in duties, however, defeated the very object of stabilizing
the currency on the gold standard.^ The much needed
correction of the balance of trade and payments was not made
and the conflict between the monetary force of the inter-
national debts and the normal operation of the gold standard,
and the desire to maintain prices, to industrialize, and to
provide home markets continued.
The most important general cause of tariff enactment,
12. LiepmiTn7~~op» clt
., p. 361.
13. Ibid., p. 362.
14. Salter, A., "Stabiliza tion and Recovery," Foreign Affairs,
Vol. 14, No. 1, (October, 1935), p. 18.
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however, lay not so much in monetary difficulties as in the
depression in agriculture which followed the war. It was a
world phenomenon; the Middle West, Canada, Australia, the
Balkans, Middle Europe, even France suffered from a relative
fall in the price of staple crops. The secular tendency was
apparent before the war. Scientific methods had been intro-
duced into the farming areas of the world greatly increasing
production. This secular tendency was much speeded up as a
15
result of the war.
In Eastern Europe the aftermath of the great conflict was
a far reaching revolution in agriculture. Not only was the
balance between industrial centers and agrarian areas dis-
turbed, but as a result of the division of large estates into
small holdings much more land was put under cultivation. In
numerous countries the new small farmer endeavored to with-
draw from the competition of the grain markets by producing
meat, butter, 1 eggs, vegetables and the like for their own
needs and for their local markets. Latvia and Estonia turned
to doing farming on the Lanish system. Yugoslavia began to
producevca ttle and fruit. Rumania began to raise corn in-
stead of wheat. While the reorientation of agriculture was
.going on in Europe, Canadian, Australian and American wheat
acreage was being gradually reduced. In America alone the
decline was from 75.7 million acres under cultivation in 1919
i
%
»
15. Beveridg'e, W., Tariffs, The Ca3e Examined, (New York),
(1931), p. 149.
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16
to 52 million in 1925.
The peculiar characteristics of supply and demand in
agricultural produce makes it exceedingly difficult for the
17
farmer during a depression. The production of staple
articles of food, especially wheat, are dependent on a demand
which is subject to physical limitations. A reduction in the
price of other types of consumer’s goods might be expected to
result in a larger proportion of sales, but reduction in the
price of wheat, even a relatively great one, is not likely to
result in a greatly increased demand lor it. It was from this
condition that the agricultural producers suffered. There was
a powerful squeeze on the producer during the era of the
twenties to turn from agriculture to some other line of pro-
duction where the demand was more expansible and the income
18
rose more rapidly. This squeeze was depression.
A brief survey of the countries of Europe will serve to
show how these forces produced progressively higher tariffs
in country after country. It will make clear also the sort
of world in which the United States had emerged as a great
power
.
On the first of January, 1925, Germany regained her
commercial freedom and on that date she had to determine
16 . Loveday
,
A
. ,
"World Economic Conditions”, The Economic
Consequences of the League
,
(London, 1 93 0 ) , p . 18.
17. Williams, ”The United States Tariff and Our International
Financial Position”, loc . clt .
18. Beveridge, op. clt
. ,
p"7 150.
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whether to embark again on her traditional protectionia
t
policy or not. Desoite the almost overwhelming opposition
of the country's economists, the dominant political forces
decided for protectionism. The result was the reestablishment
of an agrarian tariff in 1925-26 which by 1927 contained
specific rates appreciably higher than those which obtained
in 1913. Duties in 1927 on such items as cereals, flour,
livestock, fruit, and vegetables were on the average 55 to
65^ higher than those of 1915. To some extent this high
average was counteracted, for prices had risen to such en
19
extent that the duties were relatively low. The effect
of monetary disorders is clearly evident in the industrial
policy of Germany. During 1922-23 a series of upward re-
visions were made in order to adjust tariff revenue and pro-
tection to the rapidly declining value of tbe paper mark.
Out of 946 items contained in the German tariff, 227 were
wholly or partially increased by the end of 1923. Of this
number only 46 were agricultural items while 231 were in-
dustrial products. When in 1924 the mark was finally stabili-
zed at its pre-war value these rates were not appreciably
reduced. Thus since 1925 Germany had had a strongly pro-
20
tective tariff, in some cases a directly prohibitive tariffo
By 1929 Germany had begun to introduce compulsory milling
regulations which prescribed how much German grain German
19. Liepman, opT. cit., p. 58.
20. Ibid., p. 115.
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21
mills had to consume.
Emerging from the disturbance of the war and disruption
of a post war inflation France established in 1927 a new
tariff based to a large extent on the Franco-German Commercial
Treaty of 1927. The tariff level for agrarian items in 1927
was considerably lower than for 1913 in fact, for while the
. 2gduties had remained about the same prices had risen by 30$.
Industrial rates for France were set in the Commercial Treatie
with Germany, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland. Between 1927
and 1931 there was a steady increase in rates in order to
maintain their relative position with the price level. No
23
less than 1700 industrial items were affected.
In 1921 the Swiss increased the rates in their tariff
sharply, so sharply indeed that in some cases the duty
24
reached 300 to 500$ of the rates as they stood in 1913.
The rate of duty on semi-manufactured goods rose by 110 to
140$. The level for industrial finished goods rose even
higher. With duty rates increased by 150 to 200$, the tariff
level rose to 15.3$ to 20$, approximately a doubling of the
25
pre-war position.
Protectionism as it developed in the Balkans has already
been referred to, but it may be well to give a more extensive
21. Ibid
.
,
p. 61.
22.. Ibid., p. 66.
23. TbTcT. p. 123.
24. IblcT., p. 77.
25. Ibid
.
p. 139.
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description, for here protection reached classic proportions.
Bulgaria started with a tariff in 1922 of a highly protective
character, but in 1926 this tariff was revised with respect
to over two hundred items. The rates in some cases were
elevated by as much as 50$. Her tariff wall was the highest
26
in Europe both for agricultural and industrial items.
Roumania » s policy was characterized by protection of the most
27
drastic kind. Hungary raised her rates over those which
had. existed in 1913. In 1913 as part of the Dual Monarchy,
the rates with which she surrounded herself were among the
28
highest in Europe. Yugoslavia in her tariff of 1925 raised
duties sharply on most agrarian items so that by 1927 it was
29
between 120 and 210 per cent.
The case of Italy affords a clesr example of the logical
outcome of the nationalistic desire to sever the lines of
economic dependence on foreign countries. Prior to 1922
Italy had maintained her pre-war policy in regard to agrarian
rates, a policy of high rates; she had not, however, raised
them. With the seizure of power by the Fascists her policy
changed radically. She moved towards a policy of self-suffi-
ciency, especially in wheat production, but in other branches
of agriculture also. This policy was fostered by such
methods as confiscation of land for improper cultivation,
26. ibidT
^ p. 9 8
.
27. Tbid
.
,
p. 160.
28. Ibid., p. 162.
29. Ibid., p. 96.
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30land reclamation, and export and production bounties. The
Fascists applied themselves as energetically to the task of
of industrializing Italy as they did to increasing agricul-
tural output. Tariffs played a decisive part in this program,
31
although other means were not neglected by the party.
Significant for Europe, but of overall importance for
the United States was the swift change which occurred in
America's status in international financial relations. The
transition of the United States from a debtor to a creditor
nation was taking place during the pre-war period with apparent
ease. The war, acting as a potent catalyst, effected in the
space of a few years the changes that might ordinarily have
taken decades. Europe, the center of the conflict, was
forced to abandon her export connections with other areas and
by the same token, to increase her imports tremendously.
Thus the flow of trade as it had existed prior to the war was
almost completely disrupted. Debtor-creditor relationships
32
were rearranged within the space of a few years. American
exports of foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and explosives
increased greatly while imports remained approximately the
same. The result was an excess of exports over imports of
$15,974,000,000 for the period July 1, 1914 to December 1,
30. IbjLd
. ,
p. 7l
.
31. Ibid
., p. 127.
32. National Industrial Conference Board, The International
Financial Position of the United States, TNew York,
1929), p7 35.
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• 1919 or an Increase of some 36 per cent over the balance for
pre-war period 1873-1914. Europe financed this adverse
balance primarily by private borrowing, and by the repatriation
of American securities. Foreign capital issues in the six
years during which the capital market was under the influence
of war conditions totaled approximately $3, 536, 607, 700 or
33
about six times the total of all such issues prior to 1914.
^
The war, in short, left the United States a creditor to an
almost unprecedented extent.
It has been estimated that the total capital obligations
of foreigners to Americans at the end of 1919 was around
34$18 billion.*"' This represents the nominal value, the market
value of such paper was about $100 millions less. The market
value of credits advanced by the United States Government to
foreign powers was, as determined by the funding negotiators,
substantially less. The gross creditor position with adjust-
ments made has been placed at about $14 billion rather than
$18 billion.
All American securities were not repatriated during the
war. Indeed it is estimated that approximately one half, or
roughly $2.8 billions, remained in foreign hands. Moreover,
foreigners held around $1 billion in bank balances in the
United States at the close of 1919. Thus the United States
33.
34.
Stewart, M. S., ’’American Commercial Policy and the World
Crisis”, Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. VIII, No. 6,
(25 Mey, 1932)7
N. J. C. B., op. cit., pp. 48-94. For a short account of
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hed about $3.8 billions of foreign obligations which must be
set against her gross credits. The nominal value of the net
creditor position was then about $14.1 billions. Allowing for
the probable market worth of outstanding issues and government
advances, the net obligations of foreigners came to around
$10 billions. This figure represented an excess of some $7
or $8 billion over the net capital debt to foreigners a s of
1914.
Briefly then the result of the war had been to make
Europe America's chief debtor although she was also America’s
principal creditor. Canada was the next most important debtor
country closely followed by Latin America, but both these two
were overshadowed by the capital liabilities of Europe. Sub-
sequent developments only served to emphasize what had
occurred
If Europe had diligently attempted to pay back the loans
which it had contracted it would have meant a serious cut in
the standard of living, for only by increasing exports could
this objective have been achieved. In countries with living
standards already reduced to a near minimum the added strain
would have been impossible. It was at this point that the
curiously unrealistic commercial policy of the United States
began to emerge. From the start the American government tried
to collect its debts. As it became increasingly apparent that
this was an impossibility, at least under existing arrange-
35. N. J. 0 . B
. ,
op. clt
. ,
p. 49.
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ments, steps were taken to ease the burden. A Debt-Funding
Commission was established which concluded agreements for the
reduction of interest on the debts and extended the length of
36
time for repayment. The Dawes Committee was set up to in-
vestigate the entire reparations problem. Although the Plan
did not reduce the total of the inter-allied debt obligation
to the United States, it did serve as an incentive to American
37
private investment in Germany.
Sir Arthur Salter in summing this period up has said*
The end of the war found the belligerents
impoverished and heavily indebted. Had it not
been for the establishment of the gold exchange
standard and for the willingness of the United
States to pour new billions of dollars into Europe
and the rest of the world, the post-war period
would necessarily have been one of deflation, high
taxation, and economic stagnation. Deflation,
however, means lower prices and lower prices are
particularly detrimental to the debtor. Thus, even
if the United States had not become a great inter-
national lender, and if the world at large had
not adopted inflationary policies, it is doubtful
whether the low price structure that would have
prevailed in the post-war period would have permitted
the debtors to pay their debts to the United States
in full, even assuming a willingness on the part of
the United States to accept commodities. By making
new foreign loans the United States merely post-
poned the day of reckoning and made more remote the
day when the deflation of commodity prices had to
begin, and when the stark reality of the impossibility
of transferring all the debts to the United States
would become evident. For the time being, however,
the .large volume of foreign loans made by the ITnitgg
States gave the world an appearance of prosperity.
36. Stewart, M. S., ’’The Inter-Allied Debt; An Analysis”,
Foreign Policy Renorts, Vol. VIII, No. 15, (28 September,
1932), p. 175.
37. Buell, R. L., Isol a ted America (New York, 1940), p. 171.
38. Salter, A., Recovery
,
The Second Effort
,
(New York, 1932)
p. 51.
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This then is the dilemma which confronted the makers of
America's commercial policy# The policy they adopted towards
the debts gradually let us off that horn, but not until con-
siderable damage had been done. The great need of foreign
countries was obviously dollars. This salient fact, however,
was not recognized by those who established our policy for
they adopted a systematic policy of obstruction to those
channels through which the foreigner could obtain them.
Drastic restructions were placed on immigration into this
country to safeguard, so it was said, the American standard
39
of living# This reduced immigrant remittances# The
American merchant marine, although notoriously unprofitable,
was subsidized by the government thus taking away the
opportunity of foreign nations to render this service. 4°
Further, a policy of trade promotion was adopted by official
as well as private agencies in an effort to maintain a ”fav-
41
orable” balance. Finally, protection of home markets
against foreign competition by high tariffs was adopted.
In 1921 Congress passed an Emergency Tariff Act which
imposed duties upon meat, corn, wheat, wool, and sugar.
This Act was followed in the next year, by the Fordney-KcCum-
ber Tariff. Here again may be observed the forces - nation-
alism, depression, agricultural maladjustment, inflation -
39. Buell, op. citT, p. 174.
40. Stewart, M. S., ’’American Commercial Policy and The World
Crisis”, op. cit., Vol . VIII, No. 6, p. 74.
41. IBid
.
,
p. 73.
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whlch were operating in other countries towards the same end.
42
The Tariff Act of 1922 is immediately explicable in
terms of both war experience and the depression of 1920-21.
It also resulted as have all our tariff legislation, from
the conflicting desires and prejudices of heterogeneous
economic and geographical elements. The debators rarely,
if ever, involved the question of the
t
fundamental validity
of the tariff in either national or international terms.
The war had acted as a more effective tariff than that which
any legislation could achieve. Not only were the majority of
imports shut off, but articles of American manufacture which
had been produced under the protection of the tariff in the
pre-war era were now on an export basis. No experience with
normal tariff problems had been derived from the war years yet
the urge for protection was never stronger. The war contribu-
ted to a bombastic Americanism which was equal to the nation-
alistic fervor of many a European state. Furthermore, the
experience of the first years of the war when American was
ill-prepared economically left many people with the feeling
that the "war babies’’, the industries that had sprung up to
meet vital needs that formerly had been satisfied by foreign
goods, should be protected and preserved for future even-
tualities* Finally, the agricultural West supported the
tariff with a vigor unprecedented in previous legislation.
42. Taussig,' F. W., Tariff History of the United States ,
(New York, 8th ed
. , 1931), p. 447R.
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The effect of the war is readily understandable.
Heightened nationalism quite naturally became associated with
the stronger protectionist sentiment, but the development of
a protectionist philosophy lies more, perhaps, in the facts of
the depression of 1920-21. The brief period of prosperity
wrlch the American farmers had experienced during the war came
to an abrupt end. Agricultural prices at that time underwent
a precipitous decline. During the war farm prices had been
high indeed; corn sold for as much as $2.00 a bushel, oats
for $1.00. In terms of index numbers, with the average from
1909 to 1914 as 100, the buying power of farmers advanced from
101 in 1914 to 118 in 1916, 175 in 1917, 202 in 1918, 213 in
1919 and in 1920 it fell back only to 211* In 1921, however,
it dropped to 125* The prices of wheat, corn, meat, and cotton
suddenly were cut to one half or a third of the war figures
High tariffs, whose wonder working effects had long been
assumed, seemed the ideal measure to restore agriculture to
its war time level.
Politically the scene was set for upward revision of the
1913 tariff. The victory of the Republicans in the election
of 1920 had been overwhelming, and their control of both
houses was unchallenged. Tariffs are an accurate barometer
of the political party in power. In 1890 with Republicans in
control the McKinley Act was passed. Their defeat in 1892
43. Harlow, R.~~V., The Gr ow th of the United State s
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pa ved the way for the passage of the notable Wilson "free
trade” Act in 1894. Republicans, returning to power in 1896
•V
passed in 1897 a tariff with heavily accentuated protective
duties. Democratic victory in 1913 resulted in lower rates.
1922 again saw the Republicans in power.
The tariff debated which preceded the passage of the Act
of 1922 were marked by mutual concessions between agricultural
and manufacturing interests. Favors were constantly exchanged.
The nebulous principle on which most duties were constructed
was the familiar phrase ”equs liza tion of cost", kore than
at any other time in the past this principle represented the
dominant theory of congressional thinking. And more than this,
it was pushed to a further extreme than ever before. There
were Senators present who pressed for duties of 500 or a 1000
per cent "for the sacred purpose of equalizing costs." The
protective system was the subject of fervid enthusiasm. Be-
tween the feeling of exaltation on the part of the Republicans
as a result of their victory at the polls and the desire for
some remedy for the depression of 1920-21, the tariff rates
were boosted to an unprecedented height.
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III. CONGRESSIONAL ECONOMICS, PROTECTIONISM IN
THE MAKING
The Congressional Tariff Theory as it appears in its
final form in the Tariff Act of 1929 is fully set forth in
the Report of the Ways and Means Committee of the House,
in the Hearings before the House and Senate Committees, ana
in the records of the full debate in the legislative chambers*
1
The Report of the Ways and Means Committee based, so it
asserts, on the testimony of "over 1,100 persons”, and on
300 additional briefs does not present an organized body of
principle, rather it is a collection of miscellaneous argu-
ments, more or less familiar to all tariff controversy, from
which the protectionists in the House and Senate and through-
out the country could draw whatever ammunition suited their
need. The purpose of the proposed Bill, so its supporters
on the Committee stated, was "to adjust the difference in
competetive conditions at home and abroad, based upon our ex-
perience under the existing tariff law. It is intended",
the Report goes on "to maintain confidence, encourage indus-
try, foster agriculture, provide employment for our
27,000,000 of wage earners, and promote the continuance of
2
our great and unusual prosperity." Our experience under the
1. Report No7~77 2 parts. Tariff Readjustment - 1929,
(Washington, 1929).
2. Ibid., p. 9.
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previous law according to Mr. Hawley, chairman of the House
committee, had been one of "unprecedented development". The
Bill had in fact been an unusual success. It had in his own
words "brought an unprecedented prosperity generally to our
people" for it had (at the risk of repetition) "restored
3
confidence, rehabilitated industry", and "fostered agriculture".
It seems strange in view of this that anything in the previous
act should have required alteration. The Report stated,
however, that the foreigners "have an uncanny aptitude for
discovering what goods, wares, and commodities are unsuffi-
4
ciently protected and attacking them." Since 1922 these
"attacks" had come in increasing numbers and it was to prevent
them that a revision was proposed.
The Report lists as the "Reasons for the Readjustment"
the changes in "business conditions". It states that new
types of goods are being manufactured which are destined
primarily for the American market which "attack" American
goods in new ways, and cites the development of new competitors
for American markets such as Czechoslovakia and Italy, The
most damaging influence, however, was the increase in the
effectiveness of foreign labor while their wages remained at
5
a low level. This competition by pauper labor was obviously
unfair. The Tariff readjustment was undertaken, generally
3~, Tb id
.
,
p. 3 .
4. ibid
.
,
p. 4.
5. Fetter, F. W., "Congressional Tariff Theory", American
Economic Review, " Vol. XXIII, No. 3, ( September , *1933 )
.
«ric .tM oJ
<
:
.
.
. i
w t'XOVOWOf
! ' *
r
*
<.
C' 1
J.
-
1
’
'
' C’-'- •
.
. c u bv . :t ' : w; je/. t u.n\J
•' r
? 6 ; »i •
.
bfin/^oet ^nl^cS an:# Bboc ,
.
3 • <•,*? •-. - j,{ l9fj j .9 1 i T;ot: el n i c. 0
«
.
.
*V
,
•
•
*
-34-
then, to make it meet "modern conditions". The proposed
legislation was also Intended, it was added, as "early ful-
fillment of promises made in the recent campaign."
Nowhere does the report set up a test by which the need
for readjustment in specific items may be judged. The con-
stant emphasis on the low cost of production in foreign
countries left little doubt, however, that the products of
pauper labor were to be placed in the category of the un-
desirables. In the reports of some of the subcommittees
the principle of cost equalization is referred to, but in
actuality this principle even where cost could be determined
was neglected. In general the effective test was whether or
not imports of any specific sort were increasing and "attack-
ing" American products. Any increase was sufficient evidence
of unfair competition to warrant a "readjustment" of the
existing rate.
Agriculture, particularly, was to receive its share of
congressional consideration. In recent years it had been
noticed that "there has been some depression in agriculture".
The present Bill would therefore increase protection for the
farmer. Indeed, the increase in a number of instances would
7
be "very material".
The Republican majority rejected the idea that the
6. Fetter, F . W
. ,
'"Congressional Tariff Theory", American
Economic Review," Vol. XXIII, No. 3, (September, 1933).
7. Report No. 7, Part I (Hawley, Majority Views), p. 5.
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Tariff would result in higher prices, and just as summarily
dismissed the thought that a tariff could have an injurious
effect on our foreign trade. Competition flourished in
America and under the protective system it can be expected
that such domestic competition v/ill keep prices at a reasonable
level, so their reasoning went. Foreign products are sold
at a price below that of ’’competing American products” in
order that they may ’’capture” control of the market. They
are sold at prices far greater than their cost of production.
Buyers, however, "unaware of the great profits being made on
them” may unfortunately prefer the lower priced foreign goods.
This discouraging tendency must be corrected so the committee
argued, and the tariff, they reasoned, was the proper instru-
ment for this purpose. It was nevertheless unreasonable to
assert that the tariff might have a depressing effect on our
foreign trade. The Report states quite bluntly that ’’the
protective tariff had not operated to the disadvantage of our
foreign commerce, which has greatly increased under the
8
Tariff Act of 1922.” The idea was even put forward by the
Congressman that a high tariff would encourage impar ts by
making us more prosperous and thus making it possible for us
9
to pay for more imports.
Nationalism, always a strong motive in American tariff
8. Ibid 7, p. T.
9. Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Theory”, op. cit
.
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I s
history, was expressed fully in the Report. The philosophy of
protectionism in this country has always been predicated on the
idea that "political freedom and economic independence are
considered strictly as a "domestic question". The Report
confessed that a great interest in the proposed readjustment
had been manifest by foreigners, and briefs submitted through
the State Department had generously been incorporated into the
records of the hearings, but officials of foreign governments
and foreign nationals were not allowed to speak. Although the
Committee piously asserted that it appreciated the "importance
of our relations to foreign countries" they believed, they
continued that "our first duty was to our own people and to
the maintenance of their prosperity." In the legislation that
was being submitted to the House they had attempted to steer
an "even course" balancing "due consideration to our foreign
neighbors" with their "first duty" to the people of the
11
United States."
The ommissions in the Report are quite as significant as
the ideas expressed, perhaps more so, for an understanding of
congressional theory. In the Report, for example, there is
not a single word concerning the war debts. The tremendous
change in our creditor position was completely neglected. The
Report shows little grasp of the fundamental economic issues
which a tariff imposed at that time would evoke. The emphasis
inseparable .
"
10 That being so, tariff readjustment was to be
\
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on the "domestic" nature of the Tariff precluded consideration
of the inevitable effects it would have on our own position
in world trade, or its impact on the commercial policies of
other nations, or its repercussions on the future development
of our own commercial policy*
briefly then the Bill represents dominant congressional
tariff theory as desiring to secure a "preferential right"
for American producers in American markets. Because of the
"low wage conditions" abroad, a tariff is necessary to bring
this about, but prices in this country will not rise for
domestic comnetition will keep them down. If imports are
increasing the tariff rate needs "readjustment" and the
tariff, properl.y readjusted, will create prosperity. Our debt
structure and our position as one of the great creditors and
12the greatest lender in the world may be neglected*
Cordell Hull, Democratic representative from Tennessee,
13
alone filed a minority report* ' His major point was that
the United States had developed a tremendous - "20 to 25
billion dollars" - annual overproduction capacity. The need
patently was not for a higher tariff, but for an extension of
14foreign markets through a liberal trade policy. He apparent-
ly was the only member of the committee to recognize that our
change from a debtor to a creditor nation was an important
12. Adapted from Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Theory", op .
ext., p. 415.
13. Report No. 7, part 2 (Hull, Minority Views).
14
. Ibid
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factor which should be included in calculating our tariff
15
policy. Our prosperity, he argued, was not the result of
tariff protection, but developed from our superiority in labor-
16
power, machinery, horse power, and mass production. iurther-
more, high wages had become a permanent part of our incustrial
system before the passage of t he Fordney-jV.cCumber Act and were
a conspicuous feature in the automobile, railroad, and build-
17
ing industries which were ’’non-tariff sheltered.”
Agriculture, which was largely on an export basis could
not possibly, Hull said, profit from a higher tariff. He
pointed to the failure of the Emergency Tariff of 1921 and the
Tariff Act of 1922 to secure even the slightest benefits for
the farmers. 18
Hull pressed generally for a broad view of the problem.
He called for an impartial fact finding commission which would
investigate the tariff and its related problems. Generaliza-
tion should not be made on the basis of the testimony of the
”friends” of the tariff, but should ’’visualize the nation as
a whole - as one great financial unit, one giant productive
plant with ever increasing surpluses, and as the chief out-
standing factor in the present interdependent and inter-
locked financial, commercial, and economic affairs of the
19
world” No other man in Congress exhibited such a comprehen-
15. Ibid
. ,
p. 3,4.
16. Ibid
. ,
p. 4.
17 . Ibid .
18. Ibid
.
,
p. 3,6.
19
. lbid
. ,
p. 4
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sive view or such a well-developed tariff philosophy.
It is not to be wondered that the Report was little more
than a melange of arguments, for the system which produced it
was ill-equipped to develop a reasoned approach to the pro-
20
blem or a broad, sound solution. What few tests that had
been set up to determine the need for and extent to which
readjustments should go were almost completely neglected. The
hearings were pushed forv/ard with a speed inconsistent with
the purpose of a general examination of the issues involved.
21
The proceedings took on the character of a race. It is no
wonder then that the avowed purpose of the Bill, the adjusting
of competitive conditions, the equalization of the cost of
production between the domestic producer and the foreign
producer was treated in such a lax and careless fashion.
The public notice of the hearings issued by the Committee
on Ways and Weans requested petitioners to include in their
briefs Information on "domestic costs and wages and comparable
costsand wages in foreign countries." 2^ On the basis of
this information they were to establish the rates which would
ultimately be included in the Bill. The Committee in fact
never defined what was meant by "cost" and never required the
petitioners to base their calculations on a universally
accepted, prescribed formula. This ommission was of little
20. Scha tt schneider
,
E. E., Politics
,
Pres sure and The Tariff
,
(New York, 1935), passim.
21 . Ibid
. ,
p. 31
.
22. See foreword of any volume of the Hearings held by
either Committee.
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consequence for no effort was even made to determine the
23
accuracy of the figures that were submitted to the Committee.
The language of the briefs delivered to the Committee
clearly indicate how unreasonable was the basis of later
decisions in the schedules, and the conclusions in the Report
for they frankly admit in most cases the utter impossibility
of getting accurate information on foreign costs or even
accurately estimating them. The brief of a chain manufacturer
states ’’Compare tive costs of production of chains in the
United States and various foreign countries have not been
ascertained by reason of the absence of authentic cost
records of foreign manufacturers and the broad variation among
the American plants in the production cost of different sizes
24
and types of chains.’.’ Another brief reads, ”We naturally
have no definite information as to the cost of dry plates
in the countries referred to, but we must assume, for the
sake of argument that, labor, as well as cost, etc. is a great
deal cheaper in those countries than that which prevails in
25the United States,” In similar words the great majority of
the people who appeared before the House Committee confessed
their inability to produce figures sustaining their claim to
protection. Since this sort of information was intended to
constitute half the cost equalizing formula it is not sur-
prising that the Report was unable to adduce fact rather than
23. Schna tt schneider, op. clt
. ,
p. 67.
24. Hearings Before the Committee on Ways and Keans, Vol. 3
p. 1883.
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vague generalization to support its conclusions.
The other half of the equation is likewise massing for
domestic producers had no intention of inserting in the record
their own cost of production figures which could be read by
their competitors. Mr. J. B. Hanbough, a representative of
the Onion Growers Protective Association and National Onion
Association provided an ingenious explanation for the absence
of comparative labor costs in his brief, but one which illus-
trates convincingly the attitude of the petitioners towards
the entire question. "I did not do that”, he said. "I will
tell you why I did not do that. That is rather imposing on
the intelligence of this committee. You gentlemen know
conditions in foreign countries better than I do. You know
the labor in the United States better than I do, and it would
be an imposition for me to stand here and tell you whet the
labor cost is in the United States, and what 'it is in the
26
European countries.” When information was offered in any
detail it was usually rejected by the legislators as being
too long, or repetitious. Otherwise domestic producers would
assert that they did not know the cost in question, or they
did not wish to have it put in the record, or they would be
willing to divulge their figures to the committee in secret
27
only.
In numerous instances an increase of duty was asked by
2S~T~Ibid .
,
Vol . 77 p. 5028.
27, Schna ttschneider
,
op. clt
. ,
p. 72.
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producers who had experienced no, or at least negligible
competition from abroad, but who were convinced that there
was a possibility that competition might someday materialize.
Their reasoning briefly was that an ounce of prevention was
worth a pound of cure. One remarkable statement urges an
increase by saying, "Our claim for this is not based upon the
difference in manufacturing costs, so far as we can tell you.,
for the obvious reason gentlemen, that there are no manufac-
turing costs in foreign countries that could be learned,
because they have not reached the stage of making the product
28
yet."' The representative of the saw manufacturers admitted
that the importation of saws was negligible, but argued that
an increase might occur and "it is just guarding against that
possibility that there should be "some slight changes in those
duties .
"
The Bill when it reached the Congress had little that
would recommend it as a piece of economic legislation. In
the House the process of readjustment was to continue on the
same unprincipled basis. In a valiant effort to conciliate
opposition by ensuring an equal distribution of favors the
Committee made amendments from the floor elevating the duties
to new heights. There was little critical analysis of the
Bill from the opposition for the Democrats under the Raskob-
Smith leadership had by and large abandoned their opposition
m:
29. Ibid., Vol. 3, p. 2092
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to protection and were interested only in harrying the
Republicans while trying to get what they could for their
constituents. All pretence that the Bill was to adjust
"competitive conditions" on a somewhat dispassionate and
scientific basis was ungracefully abandoned. The percentage
of imports in domestic consumption was sometimes cited as a
reason for increasing cuties and was presumably intended to
be "scientif ic"
,
but no protectionist so far as the Record
shows ever stated exactly what percentage authorized an
30
increase. Generally the most significant difference that
developed during the debates was the Eastern versus the
31
Western conception of the tariff. The Eastern congressmen
declared that a tariff on foodstuff and raw materials was to
be avoided for it raised living costs and the costs of pro-
duction. Mr. La Guardia strongly supported a tariff, "to
protect American labor", but he repudiated the notion that
an increase should be effected in the duty on potatoes,
stating that it was "not a protection for American industry,
32
it is nothing but downright larceny." The Western con-
ception called for export debentures. Insurgent Republicans
supported by some Southern Democrats finally succeeded in
having them written into the bill. It was the only way, they
insisted, "by which to make the tariff effective for the
30. Fetter, "Congressional Tariff Theory, op. cit., p. 418.
31. Ibid .
32. Congressional Record, 71st Congress, 1st Session,
House of Representatives, 25 May, 1929, p. 1951.
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farmer." The debenture provision was st last removed by
the House and Senate conferees before the final passage of the
bill.
The idea of comparative advantage was hardly touched on.
If a high duty permitted a monopoly which might exploit the
consumer it was probably too heavily protected, but the idea
that perfect domestic competition behind a high duty might
.34
also exploit the consumer was almost completely neglected.
It was in this fashion that House Rule 2667 became the
Tariff Act of 1930. The Act, Senate Document No. 166, was,
so it stated, an "Act to Frovide Revenue, To Regulate Commerce
With Foreign Countries, to Encourage the Industries of the
United States, To Protect American Labor, and For Other
Purposes •
"
315. Fetter, ‘'Congressional Tariff Theory, op. cit.,
34. Ibid., p. 423.
p. 420
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IV. THE TARIFF, DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON
The Hawley-Smoot Tariff after a year and a half of con-
sideration finally became law on the seventeenth of June,
1930. Although it reduced some duties and placed some f oods
on the free list the general level of rates was appreciably
higher than in 1922. The Tariff Commission was retained with
little real change in its powers, although there was a -reor-
ganization of its personnel, and retained also was the flexi-
ble provision in much the same form as it had appeared in
1922.
The general form of the Act is much like that of its
predecessor of 1922. It is divided into four major parts or
"titles”. Title I is the "Dutiable List", a list which is
broken down into fifteen separate schedules dealing with sepa-
rate classifications of goods. The second part. Title II is
the Free' List, the list itself being Schedule 16. "Special
Provisions" comprise Title III. This Title is divided into
two parts. Part I dealing with our trade relations with the
Philippines, Porto Rico, Cuba and the marking of imported ar-
ticles and special kinds of imported goods. The second part
of the title is devoted to outlining the organization and
functions of the Tariff Commission. Title IV, sub-divided in-
to six parts, is devoted exclusively to administrative pro-
visions •
The schedules employ three types of duties: specific.
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ad valorem, and compound, that is, one which combines both
specific and ad valorem. Alternative methods are provided
in the Act for determining value. MThe foreign value or the
export value, whichever is higher” shall be used preferably.
If neither of these can be determined by the appraiser, how-
ever, the duty shall be based on the so-called '’United States
1
value”. Foreign value is "the market value on the price at
the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United
States, at which such or similar merchandise is freely offered
for sale to all purchasers in the principal markets of the
2
country from which exported.” Definition of "Export value”
is similar except that the value shall be based on the "price
at the time of exportation of such merchandise to the United
States.” United States value is calculated from the price
of imported merchandise "in the principle market of the
United States.” From this price is deducted the duty, in-
surance, freight, profit, and commission this leaving pre-
4
sumably the naked foreign value.
Any attempt to establish a definitive general level of
rates of the Act of 1930 is difficult for the variation of
articles enumerated in the Act is so great that no common
5denominator may be found, but the trend to increased protec-
1. Tariff Act of 1930, Title IV, Part I, Section 402,
paragraph (a).
2 . Ibid
. ,
par
.
( c )
.
3 . Ibid
. ,
par. (d )
4 • Ibid
. ,
par
.
( e )
5. Berghund, A., "Tariff Act of 1930”, The American Economic
Review, Vol. XX, No. 3 (September, 193 0T"i p. 473.
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tion is readily apparent. In only a few cases were duties
reduced and then only when great pressure had been applied on
the Congress. Manufacturers of automobiles had asked time and
again for a reduction of duties arguing, that high duties
only brought reprisals and that the automobile industry,
depending in part at least on foreign markets, could ill
afford this. The Congress was persuaded to reduce rates from
25 to 10 per cent ad valorem. Increases nevertheless general-
ly came all along the line, but of greatest significance were
the advances made in agricultural duties. Increases were
also made on the products of quarries and mines, and many
commodities that had been admitted free, some of them of little
importance, were transferred to the dutiable list. In the
majority of the cases these increases amounted to 50 per
cent, and sometimes more, over those which had existed in the
Act of 1922. In some instances the increases were as much as
100 per cent. Representatives of agricultural and mining
regions were particularly successful in instituting high
duties on crude and raw materials which were then compensated
for by higher duties on the finished product of which they
commonly formed a part. Increases on manufactured goods
otherwise were neither so systematic nor 30 great as on raw
materials, with the possible exception of the textile
schedule.
Sugar, as in the Act of 1922, received considerable
attention. In 1922 the duty had been fixed at 1.76 cents
'•
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per pound for Cuban sugar and 2.206 for all other sugar. A
new duty of 2.0 cents was placed on Cuban sugar in 1930,
although the Tariff Commission had insisted that a lower duty
should be applied. Their advice and the avowed principle of
"cost equalization" was ignored. Wheat, too, felt the effect
of increased duty. In the previous Act the duty had been
30 cents per bushel, a rate that many people felt to be ex-
ceptionally high. The Tariff Commission after investigation
recommended that the duty be raised to 40 cents if cost
equalization between the United States and Canada, the princi-
pal competitor, was to be established. During the years,
however, which served the Commission as the basis of comparison
the climatic conditions had been such that Canada with ample
rainfall had shown a comparatively low cost of production
while the opposite was true of the United States. No one
could argue that this situation would persist for long. Con-
sequently the duty over an extended period of time was bound
7
to be unfair. As finally enacted, however, in Paragraph
729 the Act reads, "Wheat, 42 cents per bushel of sixty
0pounds •
"
6. Taussig/ F. W., The Tariff History of the United Sta tes
,
(New York, 1931), p. 5017 see also Tariff Commission,
Comparison of Tariff Acts (Washington, 1934), p. 74.
7. Taussig, F . W., The Tar iff History of the United States, p.
504, see also Taussig, R. W.', "Tne Tariff Act of 1930"’,
The Quarterly Journa 1 of Economics
,
Vol. XLV, No. 1,
(November, 1 93 0 ) , p. 5.
8. Tariff Commission, Comparison of Tariff Acts
,
Schedule 7,
Par. 729. Future reference to tariff rates will be made
only by schedule and paragraph numbers. Where paragraphs
(continued on next page.)
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An important set of agricultural duties, the duties on
meat, and dairy products also, illustrate the favors that
were granted to the farmers. The tariff on sheep and goats
9
was raised from $2 per head to $3 per head. Swine rose from
10
one half of one cent to 2 cents, per pound. The rates on
cattle not only were raised, but the classification was re-
worded so that in effect the tariff was much higher than
the nominal figure would indicate by comparison. In Paragraph
701 of the Act of 1922 cattle weighing less than one thousand
and fifty pounds each were dutiable at 1^- cents per pound;
cattle over that weight, 2 cents per pound. Paragraph 701
of the Act of 1930 specifies that cattle weighing less than
seven hundred pounds each would be subject to a duty of 2-g-
cents per pound, while cattle weighing 700 pounds or more
would have to pay 3 cents per Dound. The duty on beef and
veal, fresh, chilled, or frozen was elevated 100 per cent,
11
from 3 cents to 6 cents per pound. Even reindeer meat
went up.
The hand on dairy products was not quite so heavy, but
duties did reflect the passionate congressional desire to
prove helpful in the agricultural emergency. Butter jumped
12
from 8 to 14 cents per pound while the specific duty on
8. (con. from previous page)
pertaining to the same item are numbered differently in
the two Acts the 1930 number will be given first.
9. Sch. 7, par. 702.
iO.Sch. 7, par. 703.
11. Sch. 7, par. 701.
12. Sch. 7, par. 709.
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cheese went from o to 7 cents per pound and the ac valorem
13
rate from 25 to 35 per cent. F'resh milk went from 2.5 to
14
6.5 cents per gallon. Paragraph 713 of the Act of 1922
specified that ’’Eggs of poultry in the shell, 8 cents per
dozen. " The like paragraph in the Act of 1930 made this 10
cents per dozen. Live poultry went from 3 to 8 cents per
15
pound
.
Manufacturing, too, received protection, out not so
systematically. A rather especial difficulty faced the legis-
lators in drawing up the schedules for the manufactured goods.
Duties were already so high in most cases as to be prohibi-
16
tive. There were, indeed, only a few inconsequential items
discovered on which additional duties could be imposed. The
structure set up in 1922 is largely retained with specific
duties being advanced slightly in most cases. The general
trend is best indicated by the ad valorem rates in the finer
goods. In 1922 they had been in general 45 per cent, passage
of the new Act boosted them in most cases to about 62s per
17
cent. Both woolen and cotton manufacturers received greater
protection than in 1922, while silk goods, especially velvet,
were subject to upward revision. In 1922 the duty on scienti-
fic glass instruments had been 65 per cent. It was now
Id, Sch. 7, par. ~7l0.
14. Sch. 7, par. 708.
15. Sch. 7, par. 711.
16. Taussig, "The Tariff Act of 1930", op. cit., p. 13.
17. Ibid.
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18
elevated to 85 per cent* Surgical instruments, put at 45
19
per cent in 1922, were raised to 55 per cent.
The rejection of economic reasoning is everywhere appar-
ent in the Act, but nowhere is it more clearly evident than
20
in the duty as it was finally fixed on hides. Here the
changes that occurred during consideration of the Bill em-
phasize the prominent part that political bargaining played.
The duty on hides as passed by the House was 15 per cent.
The Finance Committee recommended that the rate be elevated
to 15-g- per cent, when presenting the Bill to the Senate. The
Senate Committee of the Whole, however, removed the duty
entirely and in the Act as it passed the Senate hides were
on the free list. In the conference between the conferees
of the House and Senate these differences were adjusted and
the duty as it finally emerged was 10 per cent ad valorem.
21
In the Act of 1922 hides had been on the free list.
The Free List, Title II, as it appeared in 1930 also
contains concessions to the farmers. Sheep clip, barb wire,
**
22
and agricultural implements are to be admitted without duty.
Fertilizer and the ingredients of fertilizer are also to be
23
admitted free. But benefits were on a broader basis in
13. Sch. 2, par. 218
•
19. Sch. 3, par. 359.
20. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States
,
p. 508.
21. Sch. 15, par. 1530, Sch. 15, par. 1559.
22. Sch. 16, par. 1759, 1800, 1604.
23. Sch. 16, par. 1685.
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this title. In Paragraph 1711 Congress showed Its fine
regard for humanity by specifying that "Lifeboats and life
saving apparatus specially imported by societies and institu-
tions incorporated or established toencourage the saving of
human life" should be admitted free. Hoofs, unmanufactured,
are a significant item, while ice, leeches, Paris green and
London purple, waste rope, and the "hides and skins of the
24
India water buffalo" may also be found on the free list.
Gasoline, gold and silver, and some raw materials such as
25
gypsum, and potassium chloride are also included in Title II.
On those .items which are clearly not in competition with
American produced materials and which could be classed as a
part of complementary trade, such Items for example, as
26
bananas or ivory tusks "in their natural state", there was
no disagreement. In general, however, the items on the free
list though numerous are of small consequence. They have a
gesture value.
The Act of 1930 retained the Tariff Commission with
little change. Prior to the year 1922 this body had been
simply a fact finding agency with no power to suggest re-
27
vision in the rates as they stood. In 1922, however, the
247 'Sch. 16, par." 1693, 1696, 1709, 1737, 1704, 1691.
25. Sch. 16, par. 1733, 1638, 1743, 1745.
26. Sch. 16, par. 1517, 1731.
27. Taussig, F. W., "The Tariff, 1929-30", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, Vol . XLIV, No. 2, (February,
1930), p. 191.
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sponsors of the tariff argued that the general tariff law
had become so complex, the number of interests so numerous
and diverse, the process of revision so difficult that the
need for expert assistance and unbiased recommendations was
of paramount importance. The Tariff Commission, already at
hand, might with enhanced powers be expected to mitigate the
evils of a cumbersome tariff system, but the legislation did
not feel, however, that full power to change statutory rates
28
should be turned over to the Commission. Section 315 of
the Act of 1922 gave the President the power to slter rates
by as much as 50 per cent and transformed the Commission from
a body of fact finding experts into a strong administrative
body with quasi- judicial powers. Both the President and the
Commission were to be guided by a principle which has become
increasingly familiar through the years, but v/hich even then
had been a Republican standby for more than a decade. The
tariff, they argued, should be adjusted so as to "equalize'’
foreign and domestic costs. Its supporters, both Republican
and Democratic alike, had expected that the addition of this
"flexible provision" would result in lower rates. As a matter
of fact the provision resulted in almost all cases in upward
revision. In the eight years which intervened between the
Act of 1922 and the Act of 1930 rates were changed by pro-
clamation in 38 cases this out of the 2,800 items listed in
the Tariff of 1922. Of these in 5 cases the duties were re-
j?8. Berghund^ "Tariff Act of 1930", op. cit
. ,
p. 475.
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duced, such items as live Eob White quail and paint brush
handles were affected, but in the remaining 33 cases the
29
duties were raised substantially.
Considerable dissatisfaction was manifest with the
Commission during the discussions in 1930 and a reorganization
of the Commission was proposed, but there was little inclina-
tion in Congress for actual abandonment, of t he flexible
provision. An attempt was made in the Senate to take away
from the President his power to accept or reject the recommen-
30
dations of the Commission by reserving it to the Congress,
but as the Act was finally passed the "flexible provision"
remains much the same. The actual reorganization was one of
personnel. Members serving on the Commission at the time the
Act became law were to serve until successors to them were
appointed, but in no case were they to remain longer than 90
days. President Hoover reappointed three of the members and
replaced three members. The reorganization did not, however,
change the number of members nor did it alter the requirement
that both political parties should be equally represented. It
did raise the salaries of the Commissions from $7,500 to
$11,000 per annum in the belief that larger salaries would
31
make it possible to secure men of higher caliber* The Corn-
32
mission itself revised its rules of practise and procedure*
25. Ibid., p. 4767
30* See H. R. 2667, In the Senate of the United States,
January 6, (calendar 0ay March 24, 1930), Section 336.
31. Berghund, "Tariff Act of 1930", op. cit .
,
p. 475*
32.
Tariff Commission, Fifteenth AnnuiT Report, (Wash. , 1931)p.3.
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The Tariff Commission as previously noted is created
by Part II of Title III of the Act of 1930. Its powers are
defined in Sections 330 to 341 inclusive. Generally the
Commission is required to report to the President and Congress
on the effect of custom laws, on economic alliances, on the
relation of imports to domestic production and consumption,
and tariff relations. Factors affecting "competit ive condi-
33
tions" are also to be noted in reports.
Section 336, the so-called flexible provision, prescribes
that The Commission must "investigate and report to the
President on differences in costs of production of domestic
and like or similar foreign articles and to specify the rates
necessary to equalize such differences within prescribed
limits." 0 " Certain practises in import trade are to be in-
vestigated and a report forwarded to the President "as to ex-
elusion of merchandise from entry." They must also make
recommendations to the President concerning discrimination
36
against American goods by foreign countries. Section 340
required them "to report to Congress by July 1, 1932, the ad
valorem rates of duty converted to give, on a basis of
domestic valuation of imports, the same revenue as the actual
1930 rates would have given, levied on the basis of foreign
33. Tariff Act of” 1930, Title III, Part II, Section 332.
34 . Ibid., Sec. 336.
35. Ibid., Sec. 337.
36. Ibid., Sec. 339.
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vsluations, had they been applied against ir ports of the
fiscal years 1928 and 1929."
Section 304 of the Act prescribes the manner in which
goods imported into the United States must be marked. It
specifies that "such marking, stamping, branding, or labeling"
shall be as permanent as the nature of the article will permit
and will, furthermore, appear on the article, on its immediate
container, and on the "package in which such article is
‘imported." Failure to comply with the regulation subjects
the article to an additional duty of 10 per cent of its value,
or, if it was on the free list to a flat duty of 10 per cent.
It specifies that distribution of the goods may be forbidden
38
until they have been properly marked.
Importation of goods made by convict labor is prohibited
by Section 307. "All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise",
it states, "mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part
in any foreign country by convict labor or/and indentured
labor under penal sanction shall not be entitled to e ntry at
any of the parts of the United States, and the importation
thereof is prohibited, and the Secretary of the Treasury is
authorized and directed to prescribe such regulation as may be
39
necessary for the enforcement of this provision."
37. Ibid., Sec. 340.
38. iFid
. ,
Sec. 304.
39. Ibid., Sec. 307.
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Contlnued adjudication of disputes arising under the
provisions of the Act was to reside in the United States
Customs Courts. Section 518, Title IV, provided that the
Courts ’’shall continue as now constituted.” Each judge and
the Court were confirmed with ’’all the powers of a district
court of the United States for preserving order, compelling
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence,
and in punishing for contempt.” 40
40. Ibid., Title IV, Part III, Section 518
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V. THE TARIFF ACCOMPLISHED: NATIONAL
AND WORLD REACTION
Never has the United States in peace time experienced
such an extended and violent foreign reaction to a piece of
legislation as that which resulted from the passage of the
Hawley-Smoot Bill. The mere fact that revision of the tariff
was being considered had evoked some thirty-six official
1
protests, but this pales into insignificance beside the roar
of condemnation from the outside world which followed its
passage. Through the press, in mass meetings, and over the
radio the peoples of the principal trading nations of the
world voiced their protest and objections to the Act* The
reaction of the foreign press gives the general tenor of
feeling about the then newly enacted bill. The French com-
pared our tariff to a declaration of war, an economic blockade*
The press of Sweden denounced it as "the most terrible blow
against the economic life of the world’'. A newspaper in
England announced that the tariff was no different than the
German attack of 1914, while the Germans called it simply a
"monster of economic folly". In Belgium the Act was assaulted
with such adjectives as "narrow and malevolent", "reckless",
1. See "Foreign Communications", Hearings Before the Committee
on Finance, 71st Congress, 1st Session. Vol. XVII,
(Washington, 1929).
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and ''puerile”. It was damaging to trade, they asserted, and
contrary to the tradition of friendship that existed between
2
the two, countries . Granted that much of the writing may be
attributed to the natural excesses of the experienced journal-
ist there is in it nevertheless a hard core of reality;
namely, that the tariff would seriously impede economic pro-
gress and cause damage to many industries and hardship for
hundreds of thousands of people.
The reaction was not, however
,
wholly verbal for the
repercussions in the press were matched by repercussions in
other spheres. These expressed themselves in a variety of
forms: firstly, by a widespread retaliation and discrimina-
tion against American exports, and secondly, by widespread
and very definite effects on the commercial policies of the
3
principal trading nations of the world. Furthermore, the
principles upon whi ch America ' s own commercial and tariff
4policy was based were gradually, but inexorably, undermined.
It is necessary at the outset of any discussion of the
effects of the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act to a dmit the concurrent
progress of the world depression. The two phenomena are
intimately bound up, one with the other, the former being one
of the first manifestations of, as well as one of the princl-
2. Bidwell, W.
,
"The New American Tariff, Europe's Answer",
Foreign Aff a irs
,
Vol. IX, No. 1, (October, 1930), p. 13.
3. Mann, ~L. B., ^Foreign Reaction to the American Tariff Act,"
Foreign Policy Reports
,
Vol. VI, No. 15, (October, 1930),
p. 262.
4. Jones, J. M., Tariff Retaliation (Philadelphia, 1934), p.13.
.
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pal causes of the deepening and aggravating of the latter.
The Bill itself was not an immediate product of the ”great
depression”; hearings had been initiated some time before it
began and the general shape of the Bill had already emerged.
When the depression did strike businessmen demanded quick
adoption of the Bill, believing, so they asserted, that it
would help to settle conditions. As a product, however, of
those forces which culminated in the great depression, the
monetary disorders and t he agricultural disequilibrium, it may
justly be viewed as one of the harbingers, one of the first
evidences of the break down of the economic system. The part
which the hawley-Smoot Tariff had in aggravating t he world
crisis has already been suggested briefly, addition of detail
will demonstrate more clearly the relationship of the two.
The World Economic Survey of 1951-32 written by J . B.
Condliffe for the League of Nations argues that trade in the
post war world failed to keep pace with world production
except when that trade was based on "excessive and indiscreet”
capital loans. Prosperity during the years 1925-29 was based
upon a policy of credit expansion which contained the seeds
of its own destruction. ”The rapid increase of world trade
in this period,” the Survey states, "was caused mainly by
recovery in European trade based upon loan and credit policies
that covered up fundamental weaknesses in the economic struc-
ture. The burden of debt incurred, added to already existing
financial obligations, rapidly built up interest comittments.
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w^lch were met by further borrowing. When this borrowing was
no longer possible the balances of trade were dislocated. Re-
adjustment of these balances was hampered by inflexible price
structures and restrictions on international trade.” 5 The
traditional arguments and the usual pressure for high tariffs
were reinforced at this time when the depression first began
to make itself felt on a broad scale, especially in the large
raw material producing countries, by the addition of another
powerful reason.” At this period the additional motive of
reducing imports in order to provide a strong favorable or
active export balance from which the heavy over-seas financial
commitments of these countries might be met” came to occupy
the minds of policy makers. 5 From this time forward the
common protectionist and revenue arguments for higher tariffs
were reinforced and, indeed, quickly over-shadowed. The
entire movement towards economic autarchy and the further
restricting of world trade was ’’undoubtedly accentuated by
the alarm and resentment” experienced in most of the trading
nations of the world as the Congress labored from May, 1929
to June, 1930 on the construction of the mightiest tariff wall
n
in the history of the nation. In calling the American
tariff ”a turning point in world history” Sir Arthur Salter
says "it was obvious to anyone who looked at the world situa-
tion, as a whole that it was important that America should,
TT, League ""of Nations, World Economic Survey
,
1931-32.
(Geneva, 1932), p. 153*
6. League of Nations, op. cit«, 1931-32, p* 281.
7. Ibid.
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to the utmost possible extent receive what was her due in the
form of actual goods, and that her commercial policy should
be designed to facilitate this. In other words, the American
tariff needed to be the lowest in the world. In fact it was
one of the highest."^
The well-nigh ubiquitous retaliation and discrimination
against the United States following the passage of t he Bill
in 1930 stems directly from the debt structure, depression,
tariff relationship which existed at that time. Passage in
1922 of the Fordney-McCumber tariff was bitterly resented in
Europe, but retaliation had not followed for trade was still
thriving on the enormous loans forthcoming from America. In
1929 no new loans were available and thedepression had begun
to tumble prices, but the interest charges continued neverthe-
less, and Europe’s trade balances remained unfavorable. Pre-
cisely at this tii*e the United States undertook a general
upward revision of the tariff which threatened to increase
Europe’s adverse balances, to render the transfer of payments
9
more difficult, and to damage her specialized trades. Pro-
tests were of no avail and the tariff went into effect. It
was shortly followed by retaliatory or "defensive" tariffs in
over forty countries whose ’’alarm and resentment" were great
10
indeed
•
The World Economic Survey of 1932-33, also prepared by
p.
8. Salter, A., Recovery
,
The Second Effort
,
(New York, 1932) 19B
9. Foreign Communications
,
op. cit
.
,
pp. 3,35,43,98,151.
10.
Jones, op. cit., p. 11.
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Mr. Condliffe, states, ’’The Hawley-Smoot tariff in the United
States was the signal for an outburst of tariff making activity
in other countries, partly at least by way of reprisals.
extensive increases in duties were made almost immediately by
Canada, Cuba, Mexico, France, Italy, Spain. During 1931,
general tariff increases were announced by India, Peru,
Argentina, Brazil, China, Italy, Lithuania. In addition there
were increases of duties upon individual items or groups of
commodities in most of the countries for which information is
11
available, often on several occasions." The tariff stimu-
lated Britain’s inclination for protection and enhanced
significantly the general idea of preferential rates for an
imperial system of wide scope.
The effect of the 1930 tariff in Switzerland is typical
of the reaction in scores of small countries. We may take it
13
for a case study. The Swiss watch industry, for example,
is chiefly an export industry, 90 to 95 per cent of its
production being exported regularly of which the United States
has annually taken one-sixth. In 1929 the total Swiss expor-
tation of watches and clocks reached a value of 307,339,000
Swiss francs of which 56,807,000 or 18.5 per cent were ex-
ported to the United States. The passage of a tariff with
rates as high as those in the Hawley-Smoot Act were inimicable
to the economic stability of the watch industry, an industry
11. League of Nations, loc. c. it
•
12. Ibid.
13. This and succeeding three paragraphs adopted from Jones,
op . clt
.
, uhap. IV, pp. 104-138 *
*• r
'
* i.
*
.
-
-64-
of great Importance in the industrial life of that little
Republic. Within five days of the publication of the rates
on watches, textiles, and shoes In Switzerland protest
meetings were held all over the country while the press
clamored for retaliation and boycott. Typical of the public
reaction is this letter signed by ’’The Swiss Watch Industry”.
"The American tariff project”, it reads, "envisages an average
increase in the duties on watch products of 300 per cent
without justification. Such a project constitutes an un-
friendly act towards Switzerland, it compromises a part of
its National Economy. In order to react against a danger
which menaces us, and in a spirit of solidarity we ask all
Industries, artisans. Merchants, and Consumers to ban from
their Office, Factories, Workships, and Garages, Stores and
Houses all merchandise coming from the United States.”
Trade figures of the United States and Switzerland for
1930-31 indicate the breakdown of trade that resulted from
the boycott as well as the tariff.
Trade Between Switzerland and The United States
Year Swiss Exports to U . S. Swiss Imports from U.3
1929 207, 505,668 291,178,719
1930 144,175,647 204,806,386
1931 92, 177,984 163,556,547
Switzerland's Total Imports and Exports
Year Swiss Total Exports Swiss Total Imports
1929 2,082,551,000 2,672,427,000
1930 1, 174,554,000 2, 524,986,000
1931 1,329,377,000 2,212,198,000
i.
.
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Comparing imports and exports of 1930 with those of 1929
it can be seen that (a) Swiss exports to the United States
declined 30.5 per cent as compared with a decline of 11.0
per cent in Switzerland’s total exportation; (b) Swiss imports
from the United States declined 29.6 per cent as compared with
a 5.4 per cent decline in Switzerland’s total importations;
(c) United States exports to Switzerland declined 29.6 per
cent as compared with a decline of 30.5 per cent in Switzer-
land’s exports to the United States - approximately the same.
Comparing imports and exports of 1931 with 1929 it can be seen
that (a) Swiss exports to the United States declined 55.8
per cent as compared with a decline of 32.6 per cent in
Switzerland’s total exports; (b) Swiss imports from the United
States declined 45*3 per cent as compared with a decline of
16.8 per cent in Switzerland’s total imports; (c) United States
exports to Switzerland declined 45.3 per cent as compared with
a decline of 55.6 per cent in Switzerland exports to the
United States*
The effect of this declining trade, the result in large
measure of the Act of 1930 was the gradual abandonment by the
Swiss government of the principle to which it had historically
been devoted; namely, the unconditional most favored nation
principle. As Swiss policy evolved after 1931 it was devoted
more completely to the principle of reciprocity although
higher tariffs, quotas, and exchange controls were also promi-
nent. "The Federal Assembly of Switzerland passed a general
,•
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law in December 23, 1931, authorizing the Federal Council to
limit importation by means of quotas or by any other means it
might desire. The Federal Council, February 1, 1932, issued
a decree charging the Department of Public Economy to proceed
with putting into effect a system of increased tariffs and
quota restric tions
. Since that date no week has passed with-
out the appearance of two or three sets of quotas, straight
tariff increases, or increased import fees.”
In Italy the passage of the Hawley-Smoot tariff was
taken as a signal for the beginning of a campaign to exclude
14
American products from that country. On 30 June, 1930 new
retaliatory rates were put into effect against American auto-
mobiles. Duties on the cheapest model of Ford for example
jumped from $350 to $815.50 and that on the Chrysler model
77 went from $765 to $1385.00. The decline of American trade
was insured by the signing, one week after the passage of the
Bill of a reciprocal trade treaty between Italy and Russia.
The reaction of Canada was immediate and violent. While
the Hawley-Smoot Bill was still being debated the Liberal
majority of the Canadian Parliament, a traditionally low
tariff party, capitulated to the wide spread anti-American
sentiment. On 19 May, 1930 the Dunning Budget was approved
which provided for drastic increases in the duties on goods
15
imported from the United States* The Prime Minister, Mr.
14. Jones, op. cit
. ,
p. 69.
15. Mann, ’’Foreign Reaction to the American Tariff Act", op .
cit.,p. 271.
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King, although studiously avoiding the word "retaliation”
stated that the Canadian legislation had been influenced by
15
the increased duties proposed in the American tariff. The
Canadian legislation as enacted, although it was the greatest
tariff increase since 1907, did not assuage the anger of the
Canadian people. Prime Minister King and the Liberal Party
were swept out of office in the general election of 28 July,
1930 and the Conservative leader, Mr. Bennet, campaigning on
a platform of high tariff, imperial preference, and "Canada
first" was returned to office.
A convincing illustration of the effect of the imposition
of a high tariff is drawn by J. F. Parkinson writing in "The
Basis of Canadian Commercial Policy." By the concessions
given by Canada to New Zealand in 1925, he states. New Zealand
was able to build up a large export trade in butter to Canada,
the duty being only 1 cent per pound. At the same time
Canada built up a substantial export trade in dairy products
to the United States. The Tariff Act of 1930, however, ex-
cluded Canadian products from the American market and also
closed entry to dairy products from New Zealand* As a result
New Zealand increased its exports to Canada gradually depress-
ing the price. This resulted in considerable agitation by
the dairymen of the Prairie Provinces, Quebec, and Ontario
against the continued importation of New Zealand butter. In
16. Bidwell7 "The New American Tariff", op. cit., p. 22.
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fact it became one of the principle issues in the election of
17
that year, J. B. Condliffe describes this as "typical of a
whole series of trade diversions and protective reactions
caused by the imposition of an important tariff. It is not
suggested", he adds, "that the Hawley-Smoot Tariff was the
source of all evil in the commercial policies of the years
after 1930. The same kind of illustration could be drawn from
the tariff history of almost any country. But the United
States was not only a big market; it was also the chief
creditor country of the whole world. The Hawley-Smoot Tariff
is, therefore, a landmark in the disintegration of world
trade
.
It is indeed necessary to bear in mind in estimating the
extent to which the Hawley-Smoot tariff was responsible,
for the undermining of world trade, the wide prevalence of
economic stagnation, exchange controls, and trade barriers.
For some of these America was indubitably responsible, and yet
the entire development was too complex, too huge and over-
powering to be ascribed to the action of one state alone*^ 9
But it is also significant that the great growth in trade
strangling devices occurred almost immediately after the
promulgation of that tariff. That the American .tariff did
much to bring the old principles of commercial policy into
17. Adapted from quotation in Condliffe, J. B., The Recon-
struction of World Trade
,
(New York, 1940), p. 185.
18. Condliffe, op. ait., p. 185.
19. League of Nations, _op. ci t .
,
1932-33, p. 193
1 t
,
«
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disrepute can hardly he controverted. All over the world the
"unconditional most favored nation" principle began to dis-
appear and in its place grew a welter of exchange controls
20
and discriminatory tariffs.
The consequences of the Hawley-Smoot tariff in the
United States were no less spectacular than those that occurred
in other nations. By carrying protection to its logical
conclusion the Act undermined the very principles upon which
it was based, namely: the "equality of treatment" principle
and the "unconditional most favored nation clause." In the
eyes of the world it assumed the appearance of discrimination
21
at its worst and trade consequently suffered. " Between 1929
and 1933 the value of world trade measured in gold decreased
65 per cent. In this same period, however, the foreign
. 22
trade of the United States fell off 75.2 per cent. The
depression in agriculture was as severe as ever; in industry
it was greater than ever before. Surpluses that had formerly
been exported were thrown onto the American market depressing
the prices and ruining the low capacity producers. Obviously
then the tariff had failed to achieve the conspicuous success
which the country had been led to expect of it. The arguments
used by Cordell Hull in his minority report now began to win
respectful attention and many congressmen now came to believe
20. Ibid
., p. 201'.
21. Foreign Communications, op. ci
t
. ,
passim.
22. League of Nation, op. cit
.
,
1933-34, p. 189.
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that recovery would occur only when foreign trade was restored
and the surplus capacity of American industry and agriculture
was again employed. Their opinion was reinforced by the
economists, who almost unanimously had opposed the Eill. They
urged with increasing energy that we adopt a different course,
one more in consonance with the facts. The continued de-
pression with its attendant discontent, and the rise of the
Democratic party to power indicated that the growing dis-
satisfaction with our tariff was not to go unheeded.
Cordell Hull, always the critic of high tariffs, intro-
duced into the House in July, 1931 a proposal for reciprocal
pacts. Later in the same year Senator McKeller advocated the
repeal of the Hawley-Smoot Act. 23 In 1932 the Colier Tariff
Bill was introduced in the House. Although finally vetoed by
President Hoover its provisions retain interest for they are
broadly indicative of the thinking that was beginning to
dominate the legislature. It authorized the President to
negotiate reciprocal trade agreements, and managed to pass
both the House and Senate. Hoover based his opposition to it
on the ground that by adopting a policy that provided for
bilateral agreements we would be abandoning the historic most
24
favored nation principle.
Meanwhile, however, the Democratic coalition was gaining
power. Franklin D. Roosevelt, and other Democratic leaders
23. Tasca, H. J.
,
'The Reciproca l Trad_e Policy of the United
States
,
(Philadelphia, 1938), p. 15.
24. Ibid., p. 15.
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supported reciprocal agreements strongly. In a campaign
addreoS on 29 September, 1932, he began with a severe con-
demnation of the Tariff Act of 1930 and then proceeded to
argue for a system which would open the way for bilateral
negotiation. His approach to the problem, he state, would be
"by international negotiation as the first and most desirable
method in view of present world conditions - by consenting to
reduce to some extent some of our duties in order to secure a
lowering of foreign walls that a large measure of our sur-
25pluses may be admitted abroad." 1 Victory at the polls was
not long in coming for the Democratic party and with their
victory a definite change in the commercial policy of the
United States took place.
In 1934 the United States officially abandoned its
traditional single column autonomous tariff system and adopted
in its stead bilateralism the policy which had come also to
a position of commanding importance in the commercial policies
of the majority of the nations of the world. On 12 June, 1934
the President approved the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
which was in fact in the form of an amendment to the Tariff
Act of 1930, being incorporated as section 350 of that Act.
The Administration’s conception of its purpose was clearly
indicated in the President’s message to the Congree requesting
the power to negotiate agreements with foreign countries.
25. New York Times, 30 September, 1932, from Tasca, op. cit.,
p. 17.
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"If the American Government, " it reads, "is not in a position
to make fair offers for fair opportunities, its trade will be
superseded. If it is not in a position at any given moment
to alter rapidly the terms on which it is willing to deal
with other countries, it cannot adequately protect its trade
against discrimination and against bargains injurious to its
interests. Furthermore, a promise to which prompt effect
cannot be given is not an inducement which can pass current
..26
at par in commercial negotiations." Thus the Hewley-Smoot
Act by carrying protection to such an extreme set in motion
forces which reduced our traditional policy and in its place
substituted that of bilateralism.
26. Message From the President of the United States, Document
No. 273, House of Representatives, 73rd Congress, 2nd
Session
•
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VI. CONCLUSION
There is no reason to rehearse here the time-honored
arguments for free trade, they are accessible in varying
degrees of difficulty in a variety of texts and treatises to
all who wish to investigate them. It is more my purpose to
indicate briefly some of the defects in the procedure and
product of 1930, knowledge of which might insure the future
against a repetition of such unwise legislative behavior.
Necessarily it will involve considerations which span both the
field of economics and government, for where the governmental
techniques employed in the framing of economic policy are
imperfect for their task the policy itself will fall that far
short of the ideal.
There was no lack of theoretical argument against the
Hawley-Smoot Tariff, no lack of appeal to fundamentals, if
not in Congress at least in segments of the press and over
the radio. One thousand of the country’s prominent economists
made a public protest against the Bill, but the protest was
greeted with the peculiar contempt which politicians reserve
for professors and, as Senator Smoot said, ’’theoretical
universities.” Rational appeal, objective thought could not
penetrate the barrier of romantic nationalism that surrounded
the ’’sacred purpose” of equalizing costs. Obviously pressure
from economic fragments and political expediency were the
,.
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dominating factors in the revision and not broad principles,
and yet if a repetition of the Tariff Act of 1930 is to be
avoided e more tempered view of theory must be taken, a greater
demand must be made in economic reasoning. It too must be-
come a pressure.
In considerable measure the political success of this
dubious economic policy has been rooted in the peculiar
characteristics of our economic system. Generally, it is a
system composed of a myriad of economic units each of which
seeks its own satisfaction and attempts to maximize its own
profits. Ordinarily the Individual enterprise does not look
beyond the horizon formed by the considerations which might
conceivably affect this end. Indeed, even temporary resort
to the ” long view" might bring immediate ruin to the individual
business man. International trade is essentially the exchange
of goods for goods, it will wither and die if imports are not
accepted as payment for exports. This relationship is veiled
by the function of money, however, and as it actually appears
the relationship is one of goods -money-goods . Because the
business man operates to maximize profits he cannot appreciate
the true function of imports as payment for exports. Imports
are to him merely a dangerous competitor in the market, and
for him they have no ulterior significance, economic or
political. Necessarily he will be hostile to the "long v lew"
that permits this invasion of what he considers his sovereign
territory. This is especially true of those industries which
..
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have been bred and matured behind the tariff wall. These
industries can and do exert great pressure on the government
for the continuance and increases in the tariff duties. For
a minority the successful maintenance of this pressure is
often vital to their continued existence, for others that
justification disappeared when they went over to an export
basis, but the traditional attitude, deeply ingrained in the
pattern of economic thinking, is continued. They are usually
highly organized, know what they want and have had years of
experience in getting it. They are the "friends” of the
tariff. The policy, it appears then, is conceived to render
specific benefit rather than public good although clothed in
the garb of nationalism it is made to appear that public good
is rendered by conferring specific benefit.
The consumer who would seem the natural counterpoise t_ to
this group is unorganized, he has little or no access to the
facts, and is inarticulate. Indeed the facts themselves are
sometimes of such a "theoretical" nature that, without being
the less real, they do not command the enthusiasm that is
necessary if a counter force is to be brought to bear on the
makers of policy. The ordinary consumer is not impelled to
form a political union with his neighbor to save a few pennies
from the "friends" of the tariff, although the total saving
of all consumers, if effected, might amount to many millions,
but profits calculated in dollars, or the mere possibility
of profits which might be calculated in dollars has a galvanic
a.
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effect on the ordinary manufacturer. The position of the
importer as a foil to the manufacturing groups is hopeless.
He is generally regarded by the politician as an agent of a
l
foreign power doing what in moments of heat they chose to
call an "unpatriotic" business. Furthermore, the importer
represents no great amalgam of capital. They are concentrated
almost exclusively in a few port towns and their payrolls are
insignificant. Although they are active as a lobby, the
political pressure they are able to exert is nil, because
their economic power is so limited. Only when the larger
group, the consumer, has been mobilized behind them have they
had much real success.
When conflict between consumer and protectionist does
arise it has been found that manipulation of the duty rate is
a satisfactory device to deflect attack on the question of the
fundamental validity of the whole structure, for by "adjust-
ment” something like a sa tisf a o^pry compromise is ensured for
all concerned. The rates tend to fluctuate during the
passage of the Bill through the halls of the legislature,
reflecting with considerable accuracy the type and extent of
pressure brought to bear. Meanwhile the fustian of "equaliz-
ing competitive conditions" is trumpeted in the country to
lend an aura of scientific method to the juggling in the
Congress. That the formula is in fact completely neglected
has been pointed out. The problem of how much protection to
give has proved a perplexing one indeed. Its solution in
.,
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1930 was hardly a satisfactory one. Only the limit of the
political power of the embodied greed (or self interest) of
economic fragments acting on most imperfect, often misleading,
and sometimes consciously misused facts and figures set the
margin to w hich the rates were extended. The Rawley-Smoot
tariff is the logical and inevitable consequence of the un-
bridled desire of the few.
It is in the Committees that many of the defects of the
tariff might be corrected. It is in the Committee that the
most painstaking examination of a tariff Bill should be made
for here the Congress has direct and_intimate contact with
the people whose destiny is controlled by their action. Here
then the Bill should be periodically reexamined, not only by
its "friends”, but by those who entertain a different feeling.
Committee procedure in 1929-30 by its item by item discussion
and its rule of relevancy excluded the representative of
groups with a general interest and effectively prevented dis-
cussion in the Committees of the merits of the policy as a
whole. Yet it should have been here that consideration of
our financial relationship received its most extensive atten-
tion, for on the reported recommendations of these bodies of
experts much of the subsequent debate depends. Indeed, the
Committees should compel the attendance of witnesses for
consumers groups, it should enlist the aid of professors, it
should seek the disinterested and dispassionate. In the
fields of banking and insurance this has been done with good
.I,
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results. Why not tariffs? Development of adequate tests
should be forwarded to remove the question of the degree of
protection from the realm of pure politics. Admittedly this
is difficult, but with a nice balancing of national gain
against individual loss and individual gain against general
*
loss some tests may suggest themselves. Certainly the com-
pensating factors will appear if more general discussion is
permitted. With a tariff commission adequate to its avowed
purpose, as the present one appears to be, the datum presented
to the Committees pertaining to the equalization of competi-
tive conditions might be expected to carry more authority,
and perhaps deter the most exuberant protectionists.
This argument is predicated on a prior decision of
basic, if somewhat obvious, importance. Fundamentally we
must decide whether we really want international trade with
the enrichment that it guarantees or whether we want a quasi-
autarchy which produces less wealth with more work. There is
reason to believe that in the past international trade has
existed -on sufferance and not because it was regarded as a
valuable and natural part of the economy. A definitive view
of the role of foreign trade must be established in order
that an intelligent tariff program might be carried out.
If the general interest were to be given weight we might
anticipate a completely different policy, for a low tariff,
one approaching free trade, which takes advantage of the
geographies! division of labor and resources provides the
..
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most economical and effortless approach to the problem of
maintaining a high standard of living. Phillip G. Wright
says, "If the human cells that in the aggregate constitute
a nation were dominated by a single consciousness, acting for
the welfare of the whole and of each separate cell, there
would probably be no protective tariff." If this single
consciousness were the informed self-interest (or greed if
you will) of the consumer one might expect that high tariffs
would be a thing of the past. The Hull Program has certainly
been a step in the right direction, but the recent triumph
of the Republicans at the polls would give reason to believe
that the step is not a permanent one. The vote on the last
renewal was indicative that opposition to the Reciprocal
Agreements was far from dead. The victory of the tradition-
ally high tariff party bids fair to see the Trade Agreements
Act wiped off the statute books when it is again voted on.
There is no real assurance that the lessons of the inter-war
decades have been learned.
Another aspect of the tariff question reveals an
additional, yet not unrelated problem. The conflict between
the national and international viewpoint is nowhere of more
far reaching importance than in the field of tariff making,
for a tariff as few other pieces of legislation strikes into
other countries with deadly force. Is it then really a
1. Wright, Phillip G « , Trade and Trad e Barriers In the
Pacific, (Stanford University, California, 1935T, p. 453.
.'
.
,
,
J
.
.
.
.
‘ '
,
.
.
.
. t ,
;
•
. i. J
-80 -
"domestic question” or do other considerations intrude upon
it? The Hawley-Smoot Tariff is a clear and convincing ex-
ample of the folly of disregarding indiscriminately foreign
protests. These protests may represent quite as dangerous a
threat to American business as the foreign goods that "attack"
American products. Necessarily a high tariff works harm in
foreign countries where there are industries which depend
upon an export trade. On countries which depend almost
wholly on export trade the harm is intensified, and, indeed,
it is. not unlike the result of war and actual physical
destruction. Such countries can support but few people when
they are given over wholly to agricultural pursuits. Con-
verted to an industrial economy, however, they can and do
support far larger bodies of citizens. These citizens are
dependent almost completely for their livelihood on the un-
interrupted international exchange of goods. Interrupt this
flow of goods and is the effect much different than the ,
. • i
destruction of factories by bombs or shells? Large sections
of t he population must migrate, or die off, or the standard
of living must drop abruptly. There is not a little reason
to believe that in part at least the fall of the liberal
Shideharn government in Japan and the subsequent adoption
of an expansionist policy in Manchuria under the military
jingoes was a reaction to our tariff policy. Its effect on
other countries has been demonstrated previously. Can we in
the face of this continue to maintain that it is purely a
t.
'
.
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"domestic question”? I think not.
The tariff should be viewed then not as an isolated
phenomenon, but as a coordinate of the w hole net work of
legislation and executive acts which govern and direct our
foreign relations. It is, if a comprehensive and consistent
policy is to be pursued in our foreign relations, absolutely
necessary to see that our tariff policy is in line with our
other acts. Large foreign loans, an almost impenetrable
barrier to immigration, and a high tariff is an illogical and
impossible policy, yet this is what we have done. We must
define our objectives in this larger sphere and then insure
that our tariff policy, in general with our economic policy,
is calculated to achieve it. There must be a nice balance
between the private good of those of our industries dependent
on the tariff with the larger considerations of public policy.
V.
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